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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
TENANT'S LOYALTY OATHS
I
Unfortunately, the question has arisen' whether the
federal government can require "loyalty oaths" of tenants
in designated housing projects which were constructed
with assistance from the federal government.2 The general
scheme of the "loyalty oath" requirement is that each
tenant or prospective tenant must certify that neither he
nor, to the best of his knowledge, any person who is to
occupy his housing accommodations is a member of any
one of some 200 named organizations. Failure to execute
such an oath subjects the tenant to immediate eviction or
denial of the application of the prospective tenant.
Perhaps our initial question might be refined by examin-
ing in turn: (1) the nature of the Congressional require-
ment under legislation now in existence and (2) possible
Congressional requirements under existing constitutional
doctrine.
The interest of the federal government in a program of
low rent housing dates from the United States Housing Act
of 1937 whose stated purpose was:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States to promote the general welfare of the Nation by
employing its funds and credit, as provided in this Act,
to assist the several States and their political subdivisions
The refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Lawson v.
Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied,
76 S. Ct. 135 (1955), which held invalid the "loyalty oath" for tenants is no
occasion to change the tense of the verb! Indeed, this action of the Supreme
Court may have aggravated the problem. The Public Housing Agency has
taken the position that the requirement will be enforced in the 47 states
other than Wisconsin. The PHA assistant general counsel has been quoted
as stating that PHA would welcome a Supreme Court opinion on the law.
which he called a "'headache."' N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1955, p. 26, col. 8.
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to alleviate present and recurring unemployment and
remedy the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and
the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings
for families of low income, in rural or urban communities,
that are injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the
citizens of the Nation.3
The low rent housing program employs the grant-in-aid
2 Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955), reversing, 105
A.2d 741 (Mun. Ct. D. C. 1954); Housing Authority of Los Angeles v. Cor-
dova, 130 Cal. App.2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955); Chicago Housing Authority v.
Blackman, 4 ll.2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954); Peters v. New York CityHousing Authority, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529, reversing, 283 App. Div. 801,
128 N.Y.S. 2d 712 (2d Dep't), modifying and affirming, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 224(1954). See 53 COLUm. L. REv. 1166 (1953); Weixel v. New York City Hous-
ing Authority, 143 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1955), appeal pending; Lawson v.
Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied,
76 S. Ct. 135 (1955).
The Illinois General Assembly in 1953 required that: "Every ten-
ant in any dwelling in a housing project shall take and subscribe
an oath or affirmation in substantially the following terms:
.... I, ....................., do swear that I am a citizen of theUnited States and the State of Illinois, that I am not affiliated di-
rectly or indirectly with any communist organization or any com-
munist front organization, or any foreign political agency, party,
organization or government which advocates the overthrow of
constitutional government by force or other means not permitted
under the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of
this State; that I do not directly or indirectly teach or advocate the
overthrow of the government of the United States or of this State
or any unlawful change in the form of the governments thereof by
force or any unlawful means."
ILL. AzN. STAT. c. 671/, § 25.01 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1954).
The Illinois Supreme Court in Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman,
supra, following Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), held this require-
ment unconstitutional, at 122 N.E.2d 525:
"[I] t requires .. . [the tenant] to know as a matter of certainty
whether every organization to which he belongs in fact advocates
the overthrow of constitutional government by force or other un-
lawful means. Unless he is sure that it does not he cannot con-
scientiously take the oath, and as a result he is excluded from the
public housing accommodations. It is clear that under the authority
of the Wieman case the present requirement violates due process of
law and is void."
A proposal for "loyalty oaths" by tenants of public housing in New York
was defeated in 1952 in a New York Senate Committee. Statement of
Arthur Schutzer, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on House Report 7072
of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. at 1088
(1952).
3 50 STAT. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952).
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device of federal-state cooperation.' The state must enact
enabling legislation permitting local governing bodies such
as cities and counties to create local housing authorities
with such power as provided in the state act. Once such
legislation becomes effective the states direct participation
usually ends. The federal government through the Public
Housing Administration deals directly with the local hous-
ing authorities on fiscal as well as other problems.
The federal government makes and guarantees loans
and makes annual contributions to local housing authori-
ties for the construction and management of low rent
housing projects. The need for public housing for low in-
come families in each locality is determined by the local
housing authority in conjunction with and subject to the
approval of the local governing body of the locality. The lo-
cal housing authority then makes application to the federal
government for financial assistance. When a local housing
authority demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Public
Housing Administration that there is a need for low rent
public housing which is not being met by private enter-
prise the federal government makes a preliminary loan to
cover the cost of surveys and planning of the specific
housing developments.
If the federal government approves the proposed hous-
ing project it enters into a contract with the local housing
authority for financial assistance in the development and
operation of the housing project. The contract between
local housing authority and the federal government pro-
vides that the federal government (1) will if necessary
lend funds for development of the housing up to 90 per cent
of the cost, and (2) will make annual contributions for a
period not exceeding 40 years in an amount sufficient to
4 See CoMmissIoN ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIONS, A DE-SCmPTION OF
TwENTY FIVE FEDERAL GRAu-r-w-AiD PROGRAMS, c. 22 (1955). See also Robin-
son and Weinstein, The Federal Government and Housing, 1952 Wis. L. Rsv
581.
(Vol. XXXI
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cover the difference between expenses of operation, in-
cluding debt service, and the rental that low income
families can afford to pay up to a specified maximum. The
maximum annual federal contribution equals level debt
service on the development cost of the housing for a period
not exceeding 40 years.
No provision exists for the withholding of the payment
of the annual contribution but the federal government
may take over the operation of a local project in the case of
gross inefficiency or mismanagement. Thus far no projects
have required this type of corrective action and in fact
the threat of such action is rarely if ever used.
II
During the consideration by the House of Representa-
tives of the appropriations act which carried funds for the
Public Housing Administration for the fiscal year 1953,
Congressman Ralph H. Gwinn offered the following
amendment:
Provided further, That no part of any appropriation
contained in this section shall be used to pay annual con-
tributions on any housing unit of a project assisted under
the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, which
is occupied by a person who is a member of an organiza-
tion designated as subversive by the Attorney General. 5
We may never know the motive which prompted Con-
gressman Gwinn's amendment. In his statement to the
House he characterized low rent public housing as "social-
ized housing" and pointed out in comparison with slum
areas "... [P]ublic housing has developed worse slums
and diseases of the Socialists and Communists themselves
living in the very heart and center of the American hous-
ing projects. Everywhere the staff of the Un-American
Activities Committee has been able to examine, they are
5 98 CONG. REc. 2639 (1952).
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there."' Mr. Gwinn alluded to press accounts dating back
to 1950 of instances in which Communists were reported
to be living in housing projects assisted by federal funds.
He also pointed out that local housing authorities were un-
able to bar or evict Communists from their projects and
he added that his amendment gave the housing authori-
ties the necessary power. "It requires the authority to
evict Communists if the authority wants to collect subsi-
dies from the general taxpayer."' Mr. Gwinn concluded
his plea in support of his amendment by a general attack
on "socialized" housing. The chairman of the committee
in charge of the bill accepted the proposed amendment and
it was adopted by the House without debate.'
The reaction to the Gwinn proposal was hardly short of
electrifying. The Public Housing Administration shortly
after the action by the House issued a statement urging
the postponement of the sale of housing authority bonds
originally scheduled for April 15, 1952, on the ground
that, were the Gwinn Amendment to become law, it would
cast a "'technical shadow on the availability of funds to
meet the unconditional obligation of the Federal Govern-
ment to pay the annual contributions to be pledged as
security for the new housing authority bonds.' "" Public
Housing Administration officials expressed sympathy with
the objective of the Gwinn Amendment but felt that
policing would be too great a job and that buyers of bonds
would be hesitant less the bonds be attacked as "illegal"
financing by the government. The Administration ex-
pressed the view that the technical effect on the availability
of federal funds was " 'wholly inadvertent and unin-
tentional"' but that Congress should remove the doubt.'"
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Id. at 2640.
9 N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1952, p. 55, col. 8.
10 Ibid.
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The staff director and housing expert of the Senate Bank-
ing Committee, Joseph P. McMurray, was reported to
have told the Mortgage Bankers Association in New York
that the Gwinn Amendment would threaten public hous-
ing and Federal Housing Agency and Veterans Adminis-
tration housing programs as well. He pointed out that
Congress could hardly avoid imposing the same require-
ment for FHA and VA housing as the Gwinn Amendment
required for PHA housing."
The reaction of the administrative agency charged with
the administration of the public housing program and the
banking interests only prompted Mr. Gwinn to insist
that if low rent housing raised doubt in the bankers' minds
they might well question whether public housing was
desirable and worthy of their support. 2 -
When the appropriation bill which contained the Gwinn
Amendment was being considered by the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations statements in opposition to the
proposal were made by the Federal Housing Agency, a
group of investment bankers, the National Association of
Housing Officials, and the New York State Executive Sec-
retary of the American Labor Party. The objections to
the amendment voiced by the Federal Housing Agency
were substantially those which had been expressed
earlier. 3 The bankers expressed concern as to the effect of
the Gwinn Amendment on the unconditional obligation
of the United States with respect to housing authority
bonds.'" The National Association of Housing Officials was
concerned lest the housing program be jeopardized by the
failure of the United States unconditionally to pay its
obligations.' Only the representative of the American
L1 N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1952, § 8, p. 1, col. 4.
32 98 CONG. REc. A2498 (1952).
'3 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on House Report 7072 of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. at 1097 (1952).
'4 Id. at 1041.
15 Id. at 1056.
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Labor Party expressed opposition to the Gwinn proposal
on the grounds that liberties of the citizens would be
violated. 6
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the
appropriation bill with an amendment to strike the lan-
guage of the Gwinn Amendment." The Senate followed
the recommendation of its committee without discussion
on this point.' It should be noted that, in view of the
pending legislative situation, the Gwinn Amendment was
relatively speaking a minor matter. The big issue was the
extent, if any, to which public housing might be expanded
or even continued.
The committee on conference which considered the
measure to which the Gwinn Amendment had been offered
in the House of Representatives technically did not have
the Gwinn Amendment language before it, but there
is no doubt that the Gwinn Amendment was thoroughly
discussed in the conference committee. When the con-
ference report was offered in the House, on the motion
of the chairman of the committee in charge of the bill,
the House adopted the conference committee report with
an amendment which contained the language which be-
came the Gwinn Amendment as we now know it.'9
Senator Maybank, who was chairman of the subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations which
had charge of the conference report of the appropriations
bill in question explained in connection with a discussion
of the new language of the Gwinn Amendment that al-
though the language of the amendment related only to the
low rent public housing program the committee on con-
ference felt that if any such provision was to be included
it should be applied uniformly to any housing which the
16 Id. at 1088.
37 98 CONG. REc. 6455 (1952).
18 Id. at 6461.
19 Id. at 9003.
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government assists directly or indirectly.2" Senator May-
bank pointed out that the amendment applied to less than
five per cent of the total housing program but the com-
mittee felt that of course the same restrictions should ap-
ply to all federally aided housing. He continued:
... I am thoroughly satisfied that the other agencies of
the Government which are administering programs for
insuring or guaranteeing loans for housing, such as the
Federal Housing Administration, the Veterans' Admin-
istration, and the Farmers Home Administration of the
Department of Agriculture, can, without any serious
difficulty, adopt procedures which will make this princi-
ple apply effectively to their programs....
I can see no particular difficulty involved in such a pro-
cedure. Therefore, I shall certainly expect the agencies
to comply with the clear intent of the Congress in this
matter.21
The Senate accepted the language of the revised Gwinn
Amendment without question.
The language which has come to be known as the Gwinn
Amendment follows:
Provided further, That no housing unit constructed
under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended,
shall be occupied by a person who is a member of an or-
ganization designated as subversive by the Attorney Gen-
eral: Provided further, That the foregoing prohibition
shall be enforced by the local housing authority, and that
such prohibition shall not impair or effect the powers or
obligations of the Public Housing Administration with
respect to the making of loans and annual contributions
under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended.
The appropriation bill which became the act that pro-
vided funds for the Public Housing Administration for the
1954 fiscal year contained the language of the Gwinn
20 Id. at 8908.
21 Id. at 8909.
2 66 STAT. 403 (1952), 42 U.S.C. § 1411c (1952).
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Amendment as found in the 1952 Act. 03 There was no
discussion of the Gwinn Amendment language in either
house.2'
The language of the Gwinn Amendment was contained
in the appropriation bill to provide funds for the Public
Housing Administration for the 1955 fiscal year.' During
the consideration by the House of Representatives, a
point of order was made against the Gwinn Amendment
language on the ground that it was legislation on an ap-
propriation bill. The point of order was sustained.2"
A few days after the Gwinn Amendment language in
the appropriation bill had been stricken on a point of
order, Congressman Gwinn offered the following as an
amendment to the bill which became the Housing Act of
1954:
Section 15-7 of the United States Housing Act of 1937,
as amended, is further amended by adding the following
proviso: Provided, That no unit in a low-rent housing
project shall be occupied by a person who is a member
of an organization designated as subversive by the At-
torney General of the United States.27
Mr. Gwinn explained that he was introducing the amend-
ment at that time for the purpose of making it a part of
the permanent legislation regarding public housing so
that it would not be subject to a point of order as it had
been during consideration of the appropriation bill. Two
Congressmen offered personal "testimony" that local hous-
ing officials about the country wanting power to exclude
Communists and that they had no means of getting rid
of Communists in the absence of legislation.'m
23 67 STAT. 307 (1953), 42 U.S.C. § 1411c (Supp. 1954).
24 99 CONG. REc. 4977, 5195, 5196, 5221 (Senate debates) and 9417 (House
conference report) (1953).
25 H. R. 8583, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
26 100 CONG. REC. 4108, 4109 (1954).
27 Id. at 4478.
28 Id. at 4478 and 4479. Mr. Gwinn and other congressmen apparently
did not appreciate that the Gwinn Amendment would be regarded as per-
manent legislation despite its enactment in an appropriation bill. The Corn-
[Vol. XXXI
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Congressman John W. McCormack of Massachusetts
.offered a substitute to the pending Gwinn proposal which
had for its effect the imposing of the same conditions as
to "loyalty" of beneficiaries of all housing programs as-
sisted in any way by federal funds.29 Mr. McCormack ex-
jplained that his substitute would "... treat all persons with
'28 continued
missioner, Public Housing Administration, in a letter to Congressman Ralph
W. Gwinn, Aug. 4, 1954, stated: "The Gwinn Amendment as included in
the pertinent 1953 appropriation act is permanent legislation. . .. [T]he
Gwinn Amendment language, as contained in the 1953 and 1954 appropria-
tion acts, remains in full force and effect, and, of course, will be fully ob-
served by the Public Housing Administration." PuBLIC HousING ADunNis-
TmATioN CmcuLAR (Aug. 16, 1954). The Supreme Court has had occasion
several times to pass on the question of whether permanent legislation may
be enacted in an appropriation bill. Its most recent decision upholding such
legislation is United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940). See the opinion
.of Mr. Justice Story in Minis v. United States, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 421, 445
(1841).
29 100 CONG. REc. 4479 (1954). The text of the substitute amendment of-
fered by Mr. McCormack is: "On page 204 after line 8 add the following:
"Sec.-. (a) No Federal department or agency shall here-
after make, or contract to make, any loan, grant, annual contri-
bution, advance, or other financial assistance available for or with
respect to any housing unit or units, or guarantee or insure, or
contract to guarantee or insure, any loan made for any housing unit
or units unless the owner or owners thereof agrees (or, in the case
of any loan which is guaranteed or insured, the lender agrees to
require such owner or owners to agree) that (1) prior to the ad-
mission of any person to occupy any such housing unit or prior to
the sale of any such housing unit for occupancy by the purchaser
such owner or owners will obtain from the prospective occupant
or purchaser a certificate (to which the provisions of section 1001
of title 18, United States Code, are hereby expressly made appli-
cable) that he is not a member of any organization which, for pur-
poses of this act, the Attorney General designates as subversive
and, if the owner or owners occupies a housing unit or units, he
will execute such certificate, and (2) such owner or owners will
require any purchaser of any such housing unit or units to agree
to comply with the requirements of clause (1) in the same man-
ner as though the purchaser were the owner first subject thereto:
Provided, That this act shall not affect the validity of, or the powers
and obligations of any Federal department or agency of the United
States under any contract with respect to the making of loans,
grants, annual contributions, advances, or other financial assistance,
or the guaranty or insurance of loans.
"(b) Each Federal department or agency is hereby authorized,
-with respect to any housing assisted by it, to issue such regulations
and procedures as it shall deem advisable for the purpose of carry-
ing out the provisions of this section, including requirements with
respect to the holding or filing of agreements and certificates made
or executed pursuant to the preceding sentence; and, with respect
19561
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equality and equal punishment under the law."3 The
McCormack substitute was adopted without further de-
bate."
When the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, to
which the bill which became the Housing Act of 1954 was
referred, reported the bill to the Senate it recommended
an amendment which in effect would only require that
tenants of low rent public housing projects should be
citizens of the United States. 2 The Banking and Currency
Committee explained to the Senate that the proposal it
was making was in accordance with the view of the "ad-
29 continued
to any housing owned by the United States, the Federal depart-
ment or agency having jurisdiction thereof shall issue regulations
or procedures requiring an occupant or purchaser of such housing
to execute an agreement or certificate similar to the agreements
or certificates which occupants or purchasers would execute under
subsection 901 (a) of this act.
"As used in this section, the term 'Federal department or agency'
shall mean any department, agency, corporation, or officer in the
executive branch of the United States Government, including the
Federal Home Loan Banks."
30 Ibid.
31 Id. at 7298.
32 Ibid. The text of the committee amendment follows:
"Sec. 405. (a) The sixth and seventh provisos under the heading
"Public Housing Administration," "Annual Contributions" in the
First Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1954, and the fifth and
sixth provisos under the same heading in the Independent Offices
Appropriation Act, 1953, are hereby repealed.
(b) Section 10 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended, is hereby amended by adding the following subsections:
"(k) No part of any appropriation for the payment of annual
contributions under any contract therefore entered into after
April 17, 1940, shall be available for payment to any public-housing
agency for expenditure in connection with any low-rent housing
project, unless the public housing agency shall have adopted regu-
lations prohibiting as a tenant of any such project by rental or
occupancy any person other than a citizen of the United States, or
a person who has made application for citizenship, but such pro-
hibition shall not be applicable in the case of a family of any serv-
iceman or the family of any veteran who has been discharged (other
than dishonorably) from, or the family of any serviceman who
died in, the Armed Forces of the United States within 4 years prior
to the date of application for admission to such housing."
Subsection (a) suggests that the Gwinn Amendment was considered to be
permanent legislation.
[Vol. xxxi
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ministration"33 that the "loyalty oath" requirement would
impose a heavy administrative burden and expense far
in excess of the results which can be expected. The com-
mittee report continued: "[W]hile no expense should
be spared in eliminating and reducing the threat to our
system of government which the subversive organizations
present, whatever money and effort are spent to root these
groups and their influence from our national life should
be used in the most efficient and effective manner pos-
sible."3
During the Senate consideration of the Housing Act of
1954 no attention was given to the problem raised by the
Gwinn Amendment. It should be noted of course that the
overriding question before the Senate was how much, if
any, public housing there should be instead of the problems
of the "loyalty" of whatever tenants might be involved.
. The Housing Act of 1954 went to the Committee of
Conference after the Senate had followed the recommenda-
tion of its Committee on Banking and Currency by requir-
ing only that tenants in public housing projects be citizens
of the United States.' The Conference Committee re-
ported out the measure without either the language
adopted by the Senate or the House of Representatives
with respect to citizenship or "loyalty" of tenants in
public housing projects."
3 Presumably, the Public Housing Administration.
34 S. RE. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND
Ani. Nmvs 2765 (1954).
35 100 CONG. PIZc. 7609. 7624 (1954).
36 Id. at 11085. The author has been unable to ascertain the considera-
tions which influenced the conference committee in its decision. Perhaps an
important factor was the realization that every appropriation act since 1940
which implemented the United States Housing Act contained the require-
ment that occupancy be limited to United States citizens. Whether members
of the conference committee appreciated that the Gwinn Amendment
language which was contained in the appropriations bills enacted in 1952
and 1953 was permanent legislation is not clear. See note 28 supra.
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III
Soon after the Gwinn Amendment became law, the
Public Housing Administration directed on November
17, 1952, that all housing authorities under low rent hous-
ing program require:
All families admitted or reexamined subsequent to the
receipt of this release shall be required to sign a certifi-
cate which is in the form shown in Exhibit 1... [which
incorporated the list of organizations under Executive
Order 9835]. Also, as the local authority receives notice
from the PHA of any changes in the list, such changes
shall be incorporated in the certificate required for all
subsequent admissions or reexaminations. The new list
and any subsequent changes shall be posted on the bulle-
tin board or otherwise be made known to all tenants so
that they may be informed at all times of the current
list.37
37 See PUBLIC HousING ADMINISTRATION Low RENT HoUSING MANUAL §
403.1 (Dec. 18, 1953) replacing the issue of Nov. 17, 1952. The certificate
required of tenants (except for the reference to a different Executive Or-
der) follows:
CERTIFICATION OF NONMEMBERSHIP IN SUBVERSIVE
ORGANIZATIONS
I hereby certify that I am not a member of any of the organiza-
tions listed in the document entitled "Consolidated List of Or-
ganizations Designated by the Attorney General of the United
States as within Executive Order No. 10450," and that, to the best
of my knowledge, information, and belief, no person who is to oc-
cupy the housing accommodations in connection with which this
certificate is furnished (that is, the accommodations for which I am
making, or have made, application) is a member of any such or-
ganization. I hereby further certify that I have carefully read or
had read to me the document referred to in the preceding sentence.
Signature
WITNESS:
Date
Many local housing authorities also required each tenant to warrant that
neither he nor any person who is to occupy the leased premises is a mem-
ber of an organization designated by the Attorney General as in the Execu-
tive Order No. 10450 and the tenant was required to agree that if the war-
ranty is false or if he or any person who is to occupy the premises becomes
or continues to be a member of any organization now or thereafter so
designated he would vacate the premises. See also Note, 53 COLUm. L. Rlv.
1166, 1168 (1953).
[Vol. M=X
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The New York Times3" observed: "Prospects for lively
activity in connection with the certificate seem to be
numerous. For instance, two of the Newark [New Jersey
housing] authority's tenants have been listed in the past
as officials of the Communist party."
An examination of the Gwinn Amendment against the
background of its legislative history immediately sug-
gests three questions: (1) what does the amendment
mean by the words "organization designated as subsersive
by the Attorney General"? (2) to whom does the amend-
ment apply, or to state it another way, what is meant by
the words "housing unit constructed under the United
States Housing Act of 1937, as amended"? and (3) by
whom is the Gwinn Amendment to be enforced and what
are the sanctions for its violation?
Although the legislative history of the Gwinn Amend-
ment leaves much to be desired it will be recalled that the
phrase "subversive organizations" had considerable cur-
rency prior to early 1952. The President, on March 21,
1947, by means of Executive Order 9835"9 had promul-
gated what has come to be known as the "loyalty oath"
for federal employees. In connection with that program
the President had directed that the Department of Justice
currently furnish the Loyalty Review Board:
... the name of each foreign or domestic organization,
association, movement, group or combination of persons
which the Attorney General, after appropriate investi-
gation and determination, designates as totalitarian, fas-
cist, communist or subversive, or as having adopted a
policy of advocating or approving the commission
of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights un-
der the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to
alter the form of government of the United States by un-
constitutional means.40
38 N.Y. Times, December 18, 1952, p. 24, col. 3.
39 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947). See Note, 29 Tmnu. L. Q. 94 (1955).
40 Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935, 1938 (1947).
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Although there can be little doubt that the term "sub-
versive organization" was popularly used to refer to all
organizations listed by the Attorney General in response
to Executive Order 9835 it will be noted that the Executive
Order itself provided for five other kinds of organization
in addition to those that were "subversive." As a matter
of fact, the differentiation between "subversive" and other
organizations under Executive Order 9835 was expressed
by the Attorney General:
Applying the elementary rule of statutory construc-
tion, each of these classifications [listed in Executive
Order 9835] must be taken to be independent and mutu-
ally exclusive of the others. It may well be that a desig-
nated organization, by reason of origin, leadership, con-
trol, purposes, policies or activities, alone or in combina-
tion may fall within more than one of these specified clas-
sifications. In such cases a reasonable interpretation of
the Executive order would seem to require that designa-
tion be predicated upon its dominant characteristics
rather than extended to include all other classifications
possible on the basis of what may be subordinate attri-
butes of the group. In classifying the designated organi-
zations the Attorney General has been guided by this
policy. Accordingly, it should not be assumed that an
organization's dominant characteristic is its only charac-
teristic.4 '
That the words "organization designated as subsersive
by the Attorney General" would not necessarily refer to
the entire list of organizations designated under Executive
Order 9835 seems inescapable. One might suggest that the
Gwinn Amendment required the Attorney General specifi-
41 5 C.F.R. § 210, App. A (1949). (List of Organizations Designated by
the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order No. 9835). The original
list published by the Attorney General was broken down into the various
groups designated in the Executive Order. A breakdown in the list appears
not to have been made in connection with any listing under Executive Or-
der 9835 used by housing authorities or by the Attorney General under
Executive Order 10450 which supplanted Executive Order 9835. See 3
C.FR. 72 (Supp. 1953). The writer's inquiry to the Attorney General as to
the basis for the change in policy with respect to classifying organizations
under these executive orders remains unanswered.
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cally to designate organizations within the meaning of
the Gwinn Amendment language. As a matter of fact,
shortly after the Gwinn Amendment became law the
Attorney General ruled that the phrase "organizations
designated as subversive by the Attorney General" re-
fers to and includes all organizations designated by him
pursuant to Executive Order 9835.' When Executive
Order 10450 supplanted Executive Order 9835 for purposes
of the federal employees' loyalty program, the Attorney
General ruled that the organizations designated pursuant
to Executive Order 10450 are those "organizations des-
ignated subversive by the Attorney General" as that phrase
is used in the Gwinn Amendment.43
When one considers the question to whom does the
Gwinn Amendment apply, several subsidiary questions
immediately occur. A simple reading of the Gwinn Amend-
ment would suggest that it would apply only to tenants
occupying a housing uni constructed under the United
States Housing Act of 1937, as amended. A further
question immediately would arise: whether the Gwinn
Amendment would apply only with respect to tenants of
the housing units constructed subsequently to its en-
actment. The problem is far from purely academic as there
are low rent housing projects administered by the Public
Housing Administration which were originally constructed
under some six statutes, only three of which by any stretch
of the imagination could be characterized as the United
States Housing Act of 1937, as amended.4" The Public
Housing Administration, however, immediately after the
enactment of the Gwinn Amendment announced an in-
42 PUBLIC HousING ADMINISTRATION, SIn AxzNuAL REPoRT 21 (1952).
The Assistant Atorney General (Office of Legal Counsel) has informed
the writer that the document embodying the reasoning of the Department
of Justice in this connection is "not available." Letter of Assistant Attorney
General (Office of Legal Counsel) to the writer, October 21, 1955.
43 PUBLIC HOUSING ADMINISTRATION Low RET HOUSING MANUAL § 4031
(1953).
44 PUBLIC HOusiNG ADmSTRATiON, SnT ANNUAL REPoRT 17 (1952).
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terpretation of it which can best be described in the words
of the PHA official statement:
PHA has required that all contribution contracts en-
tered into or amended after July 5, 1952, [the effective
date of the Gwinn Amendment] must contain provision
giving full effect to the Gwinn Amendment. This require-
ment was later extended to all low-rent contracts be-
tween PEA and local housing authorities (including
leases) which were entered into, revised, or amended
after the effective date of the Gwinn Amendment, regard-
less of whether the housing involved was constructed un-
der the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended,
or under other enabling legislation.4 5
When one analyzes the problems raised by the question
of by whom and how is the Gwinn Amendment to be
enforced one need recall that the text of the Gwinn
Amendment very clearly provided that it would be en-
forced ". . . by the local housing authority, and that such
prohibition shall not impair or affect the powers or obliga-
tions of the Public Housing Administration with respect
to the making of loans and annual contribution under the
United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended."4 Despite
the language in the Gwinn Amendment, the Public Hous-
45 Id. at 21. The Acting Commissioner, Public Housing Administration,
in a letter of October 21, 1955, explained to the writer:
"The extending of the substance of the provision of the Gwinn
Amendment to this housing [which was not constructed under the
United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended] which does not
actually come within the purview of such Act was not done as a
result of any misinterpretation of this law but was undertaken sole-
ly on the basis that it was administratively desirable."
This may indicate a new constitutional theory of federal law. In defense of
the Public Housing Administration one should note that the United States
Housing Act of 1937 provided "The [Public Housing) Authority may from
time to time make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act." 50 STAT. 891 (1937), 42
U.S.C. § 1408 (1952). The Gwinn Amendment although enacted in an ap-
propriation act became a part of the housing act. Whether the quoted
language would justify the Gwinn Amendment type of regulation will be
discussed infra.
46 Text at note 18 supra. The reader will recall that this language may
have been motivated by the desire to avoid any question as to the binding
effect of the United States commitment with respect to annual contribu-
tions to local housing authorities. See text at note 5 supra.
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ing Administration has taken a very active part in im-
plementing the Gwinn Amendment, at least to the extent
of requiring local housing authorities to incorporate the
"loyalty oath" in tenant's contracts, and "in the case of
low rent projects covered by contracts in which the pro-
visions of the Gwinn Amendment are not incorporated,
PHA has strongly urged each local housing authority to
put into effect promptly, by its own resolution or ordi-
nance, the provisions of the Gwinn Amendment."' 7
Patently, the authority for this action by Public Housing
Administration must be found other than in the Gwinn
Amendment. Whether the general authority of the Ad-
ministration to make rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Housing Act
would afford a basis for the Gwinn Amendment type pro-
vision is at least debatable.
Assuming that the Public Housing Administration has
authority by rule or regulation to require "loyalty oaths"
by tenants, the question would still arise as to what sanc-
tion might be applied by the Public Housing Administra-
tion for the non-compliance with the regulation by the
tenant. The Gwinn Amendment very clearly indicates
that the power or obligation of the Public Housing Ad-
ministration with respect to the making of loans and
annual contributions shall not be affected by the amend-
ment.
IV
The question of who may seek a judicial review of the
application of the Gwinn Amendment and the regulations
made thereunder is one of considerable interest."8 Pre-
47 PUBLIC HoUSIxG ADAINISTRATION, SIruT AmruAL REPORT 21 (1952).
48 Had the original Gwinn proposal (text at note 5 supra) been adopted,
presumably holders of housing bonds, the debt service on which was guaran-
teed by PHA, would have also been in a position to question the validity
of the Gwinn Amendment. A person with an esoteric sense of humor might
find some delight in contemplating investment bankers seeking a declara-
tion of invalidity of a requirement designed to keep "subversives" out of
public housing projects.
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sumably local housing authorities who were required by
the Public Housing Administration to compel tenants to
execute "loyalty oaths" might seek a judicial interpreta-
tion of the authority of the Public Housing Administra-
tion to promulgate its regulations to implement the Gwinn
Amendment. In all reported cases, however, tenants have
raised legal questions as to the application and validity
of the regulations made pursuant to the Gwinn Amend-
ment.49
Questions of statutory interpretation may require ju-
dicial determination not only for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the meaning of the statute but also with the view of
arriving at an interpretation so as to avoid possible un-
constitutionality of the statute. The regulations issued
by the Public Housing Administration purporting to im-
plement the Gwinn Amendment must, of course, conform
to the statute as well as to the Constitution.
Any tenant to whom the regulations under the Gwinn
Amendment were attempted to be applied probably would
be able to raise the question of whether the statutory
language authorized the application of the regulations to
him. Certainly any tenant who was a member of an organi-
zation on the Attorney General's list could raise the
question of whether the statutory language in the Gwinn
Amendment applied to him.
As suggested above' ° the many possible different situa-
tions to which the regulations of the Public Housing
Administration are being applied might very well present
instances in which the regulation as applied in a particular
case would be found not to be authorized by the statute.
For example, whether the Public Housing Administration
may require "loyalty oaths" of tenants in projects origi-
nally constructed under authority of acts other than the
United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, would
49 See note 2 supra.
50 Text at note 44 supra.
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raise a real problem of statutory construction. Similarly,
the Gwinn Amendment would seem to require judicial
construction as to whether it applies to housing projects
constructed prior to the effective date of the Gwinn
Amendment.
In addition to problems of statutory interpretation there
may be questions of constitutionality of the Gwinn Amend-
ment and regulations thereunder.5 x The initial problem is
whether any constitutional issues could be involved with
respect to the requirements of tenants to execute "loyalty
oaths."
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated the position of
the local housing authority as being that: "[I]t stands
in the same category as any non-governmental landlord,
and is subject to no restrictions in choosing the persons
it desires as tenants of its housing project, which would
not be applicable to landlords generally, except only such
as are specifically prescribed [by statute with respect to
the income of the tenants].'52 The difficulty, of course,
with this type of argument is that housing authorities are
governmental agencies and thus constitutional restrictions
which are not applicable to non-governmental landlords
do apply.
When we turn to the question of who may raise the
constitutional issue considerably more difficulty is en-
countered. Among the cardinal principles of judicial
policy53 is the doctrine that one who benefits from a
statute may not challenge its constitutionality. This so-
called bounty theory has been raised in each of the re-
ported cases involving the application of the Gwinn
Amendment and in no instance has the court found it
51 See Note, 69 HAav. L. REv. 551 (1956) for the view that ". . . the most
substantial objections to the Gwinn Amendment are constitutional."
52 Lawson v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W2d
605, 607, cert. denied, 76 S. Ct. 135 (1955).
53 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
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valid. The argument has taken several variations of the
theme that since tenancy in public housing projects was
on a month-to-month basis the housing authority might
give notice of termination of occupancy for any reason,
including failure to execute an oath of non-membership
in proscribed organizations. The Supreme Court of Illinois
summarized: "The argument, in other words, is that be-
cause the tenants have no legal right to occupy the housing
accommodations, they cannot be deprived of any con-
stitutional right by the requirements in question. The
position is untenable."'  The court continued: "Even
though appellants have no right to remain as tenants of
appellee, they may not, as a condition of continued oc-
cupancy, be required to comply with unconstitutional re-
quirements." 5
It is of course a truism to observe that the federal gov-
ernment has only delegated power, at least in the domestic
field. The statute under which the United States launched
into the low rent housing field purported to be predicated
on the power of Congress to make appropriations for the
general welfare. 6 The constitutionality of the housing act
has been upheld. 7 The constitutional question with respect
to the power of Congress to enact the Gwinn Amendment
might simply be stated: Does the power of Congress to
make all laws which may be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution its power to make appropriation
for the general welfare and all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the government of the United States or
any department or officer thereof authorizes the Congress
to require "loyalty oaths" of tenants as a condition for
their occupancy in low rent projects which were "con-
54 Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522,
524 (1954).
55 Ibid.
56 See text at note 3 supra.
57 City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945).
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structed" under the United States Housing Act of 1937,
as amended?
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin succinctly stated the
problem: "Counsel for the defendant Authority have failed
to point out to this court how the occupation of any units
of a federally aided housing project by tenants who may
be members of a subversive organization threatens the
successful operation of such housing project."" Undoubt-
edly among other powers vested by the Constitution in
the federal government is that to prevent its overthrow.
The question might arise, however, whether ". . . the
laudable purpose of combating the efforts of subversives
is advanced by compelling them to live in slums or sub-
standard housing accommodations."59
Unfortunately, perhaps, we have no reported case prior
to the cases dealing with the Gwinn Amendment which
furnish substantial light on the constitutional problem
at hand. The Emergency Relief Appropriations Act for
the fiscal year 1941 carried a provision: "No portion of
the appropriation made under this joint resolution shall
be used to pay any compensation to any person who ad-
vocates, or who is a member of an organization that ad-
vocates, the overthrow of the Government of the United
State."60 The only court which construed this require-
58 Lawson v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d
605, 615, cert. denied, 76 S. Ct. 135 (1955).
59 Housing Authority of Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 890,
279 P.2d 215, 218 (1955).
60 Section 17(b) in 54 STAT. 621, (1940). Section 15(f) in 54 STAT. 620
(1940) provided:
"No alien, no Communist, and no member of any Nazi Bund Or-
ganization shall be given employment or continued in employ-
ment on any work project prosecuted under the appropriations con-
tained in this joint resolution and no part of the money appropriated
in this joint resolution shall be available to pay any person who
has not made or who does not make affidavit as to United States
citizenship and to the effect that he is not a Communist and not a
mehnber of any Nazi Bund Organization, such affidavit to be con-
sidered prima facie evidence of such citizenship, and that he is not
a Communist, and not a member of any Nazi Bund Organization."
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ment held it invalid and emphasized: "The purpose of the
relief act was to alleviate human suffering throughout the
United States. There is no necessary or logical connection
between the political or social beliefs of a person and his
distress."'" The Supreme Court of California had occasion
to consider whether a local school board could require as
a condition for the use of the school auditorium that the
applicant subscribe to the following oaths: " 'I do not advo-
cate and I am not affiliated with any organization which
advocates or has as its object or one of its objects the over-
throw of the present Government of the United States or
of any State by force or violence, or other unlawful
means.' ,,62 The Court concluded that such a requirement
was unconstitutional:
The state is under no duty to make school buildings
available for public meetings.... If it elects to do so, how-
ever, it cannot arbitrarily prevent any members of the
public from holding such meetings.... Nor can it make
the privilege of holding them dependent on conditions
that would deprive any members of the public of their
constitutional rights. A state is without power to impose
an unconstitutional requirement as a condition for grant-
ing a privilege even though the privilege is the use of
state property....
Since the state cannot compel "subversive elements"
directly to renounce their convictions and affiliations, it
cannot make such a renunciation a condition of receiv-
ing the privilege of free assembly in a school building.63
The constitutional problem becomes increasingly in-
volved when one envisions possible applications of the
Gwinn Amendment. With reference to housing units which
were constructed under the United States Housing Act of
1937, as amended, subsequently to 1952 and with respect
to which grants are still being made the question is rela-
tively simple: Does the power to make appropriations
61 United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848, 850 (E.D. Wis. 1942).
62 Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536. 171 P.2d 885,
888 (1946).
63 Id. at 891.
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carry with it authority to require "loyalty oaths"? Sub-
stantially the same question arises with respect to units
which are owned and operated by the Public Housing Ad-
ministration irrespective of when they may have been con-
structed provided they were constructed under the United
States Housing Act. The question appears not to have
arisen but the language of -the amendment suggests that
it was designed to apply to units which has been con-
structed under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended, regardless of present ownership. Such an ap-
plication of the Gwinn Amendment would seem to raise
very real questions as to due process of law.
The fact that the low rent housing program is to be
executed by the use of a system of grants-in-aid suggests
a further problem: Whether local housing authorities have
the power under state law to implement the regulations of
the Public Housing Administration under the Gwinn
Amendment. State legislation establishing housing authori-
ties is very similar in the various states, and in effect
authorizes the local housing authorities to contract with
the Public Housing Administration with respect to grants
and annuities. Typical of the state legislation in this respect
is an authorization of the local housing authorities ". . . to
do any and all things necessary or desirable to secure
the financial aid or cooperation of the Federal govern-
ment.... ." in furthering the purpose of the act providing
for local housing authorities-to eradicate slum and pro-
vide housing for persons of low-income.6" The Supreme
Court of fllinois has stated: "It is evident that the ex-
clusion of otherwise qualified persons solely because of
membership in organizations designated as subversive by
the Attorney General has no tendency whatever to
further such purpose."65 The court thus construed the
enabling legislation to avoid questions of its constitution-
64 ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 67% § 27 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1954).
6 Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 l2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522,
526 (1954).
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ality.6 6 The California court after referring to the Illinois
decision observed:
... [W]e fail to find in the act, pursuant to which plain-
tiff Housing Authority was created, anything to sug-
gest that it is authorized to use the powers conferred
upon it to punish subversives or discourage persons from
entertaining subversive ideas by denying to such the
right of occupying its facilities.67
No court which has considered the problem has at-
tempted to find a legal basis of the local housing authority
requirements of loyalty oaths other than in PHA regula-
tions under the Gwinn Amendment.6"
Assuming that the question of constitutional power
of the Congress to enact the Gwinn Amendment has been
resolved in favor of that power the question still remains
as to possible constitutional limitations on the exercise of
the power. Does the Gwinn Amendment or any proceed-
ings authorized thereunder violate the due process of law
clause?69
Increasing judicial deference to legislative judgment
as to the appropriateness of means of executing lawful
power perhaps should prompt one to hesitate to raise a
question of substantive due process on the ground of there
being no rational connection between the means applied
and the objective sought. One does have some difficulty,
however, in seeing any rational or indeed appreciable
connection between the "loyalty" of tenants as measured
by their willingness to subscribe to an oath of non-
membership in designated organizations and the objectives
of the United States Housing Act. Even the undoubtedly
legitimate objective of legislation to thwart possible over-
throw of the government" could hardly justify the Gwinn
66 Ibid.
67 Housing Authority of Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 890,
279 P.2d P15, 218 (1955).
68 See note 2 supra.
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Amendment type of requirement for the reason as the
California court suggested, "Nor is it apparent that the
laudable purpose of combating the efforts of subversives
is advanced by compelling them to live in slums or sub-
standard housing accommodations."' There has been no
suggestion of any connection between propensity to destroy
fixtures or indeed the housing unit and membership in any
C9 U. S. CONST. amend. V provides that:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any Crim-
inal Case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U. S. Co sT. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
The due process of law requirement of the Fifth Amendment would ap-
ply to the Gwinn Amendment and PHA regulations thereunder and the due
process of law requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment would apply to
action by local housing authorities. The meaning of "due process" in the
two amendments is identical with respect to the problems at hand.
70 Chief Justice Vinson wrote in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
501, (1951):
"That it is within the power of the Congress to protect the Gov-
ernment of the United States from armed rebellion is a proposition
which requires little discussion. Whatever theoretical merit there
may be to the argument that there is a "right" to rebellion against
dictatorial governments is without force where the existing struc-
ture of the government provides for peaceful and orderly change.
We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face
of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical
conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it is
not within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to over-
throw the Government by force and violence. The question with
which we are concerned here is not whether Congress has such
power, but whether the means which it has employed conflict with
the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution."
71 Housing Authority of Los Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 890,
279 P.2d 215, 218 (1955).
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organization.
The Gwinn Amendment does not apply to all federally
aided housing programs.72 Doubtless the Congress has
considerable latitude in selecting activities against which
it will legislate. Yet the seriousness of the threat by "sub-
versives" which the Gwinn Amendment presumably re-
flects may be doubted in view of the fact that possibly
twenty times as many beneficiaries of federally aided
housing programs are not required to sign "loyalty oaths"
as are required under the Gwinn Amendment.7 3
At several points the question of procedural due process
of law arises. With respect to the listing of organizations
by the Attorney General it is clear that the listed organiza-
tion is entitled to procedural due process in the listing.7 4
Only organizations proposed for listing, however, can
challenge their listing by the Attorney General. The in-
dividual members of such organizations cannot challenge
the listing of the organization.7" It is suggested that the
inability of the individual to challenge the listing by the
Attorney General in which membership would preclude
his occupancy in a low rent public housing project offends
constitutional due process requirements. For a variety
of reasons the organization listed might not contest the
listing but it would seem that the right of the individual
to have procedural due process for the listing could not
be waived by the organization.
72 Text at note 21 supra.
73 Iid.
74 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). The
regulations designed to afford procedural due process to the organizations pro-
posed for listing are contained in 28 C.F.R. § 201.1-201.24 (Supp. 1955). The
question of whether procedures under these regulations are constitutionally
sufficient is in litigation. National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552
(D.C. Cir. 1955), petition for cert. filed, 24 U.S.L. WEEx 3123 (U.S. Oct. 28,
1955) (No. 496).
75 28 C.F.R., § 41.1 (Supp. 1955). Cf. 5 C.F.R. § 210, App. A (List of Or-
ganizations Designated by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Or-
der No. 9835) (1949). Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd by an equally divided court without opinion, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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Question of substantive due process would suggest it-
self were the Gwinn Amendment applied to tenants in
buildings constructed prior to July 5, 1952, the effective
date of the Gwinn Amendment, especially were such
projects no longer receiving federal assistance. Serious due
process objections would arise were the Gwinn Amend-
ment and regulations thereunder applied to tenants of
housing projects constructed under statutes other than
the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended.
The Gwinn Amendment makes non-membership in
some 200 designated organizations the only test of tenants'
"loyalty." This fact suggests grave due process objections.
The fact must be kept in mind that the list of subversive
organizations was originally compiled for purposes of the
federal employees loyalty program. Even for purposes of
that program membership in proscribed organizations
was not in itself fatal. Membership in or affiliation with
such organizations was to be but "one of the factors by
which a department or agency" might reach its determina-
tion as to the security risk of a federal employee.7" In-
deed, the compiler of the list of proscribed organizations,
the Attorney General of the United States,
... has pointed out, as the President had done previously,
that it is entirely possible that many persons belonging
to such organizations may be loyal to the United States;
that membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic asso-
ciation with, any organization designated is simply one
piece of evidence which may or may not be helpful in ar-
riving at a conclusion as to the action that is to be taken
in a particular case. "Guilt by association" has never
been one of the principles of our American jurispru-
dence. 7
Chief Judge Swan of the Second Circuit has commented
that the Attorney General's list of subversive organiza-
76 Order of the Attorney General Designating Organizations in connec-
tion with Federal Employee Security Programs, 18 FED. REG. 2741 (1953).
77 5 C.F.R., § 210, App. A. (List of Organizations Designated by the At-
torney General Pursuant to Executive Order No. 9835) (1949).
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tions, "... . is a purely hearsay declaration by the Attorney
General. . . It has no competentcy to prove the sub-
versive character of the listed associations. . . .' Justice
Clark has also had occasion to caution against the use of
the Attorney General's list for other than its originally
intended limited evidential use under the loyalty pro-
gram.'
9
It will be noted that the Gwinn Amendment has the
effect of excluding tenants from public housing projects
not only if the tenants are members of proscribed organi-
zations, but also if the tenant knows that any person who
is to occupy the housing accommodation is a member of
such organization. One might suggest that this is standard
of "guilt" by consanguinity or cohabitation which suggests
far-reaching due process objections.
Despite the doubts which have been expressed with
respect not only to the authority of Congress to enact the
Gwinn Amendment and the grave questions of constitu-
tional due process in implementing the Gwinn Amend-
ment, should these doubts be resolved in favor of the
asserted power, the question would still arise whether
the Gwinn Amendment and regulations thereunder in-
fringe the freedom of speech and assembly clause."0
Recent decisions"1 have undoubtedly produced a revision
78 United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1951).
79 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
80 U.S. CONST. amend. I. It provides that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."
The freedoms of the First Amendment are among the liberties of the
people protected against state interference by the due process of law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment (quoted in note 69 supra). Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
81 Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952);
American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Compare Wieman v. Updegraf, 344
U.S. 183 (1952).
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in the earlier applied "clear and present danger" test'e
as to the validity of legislation when measured against
the requirements of the First Amendment. While the
apparent departures from the "clear and present danger"
standard can be explained by the presence of special
factors: "great power over the economy" in the Douds
case; "advocacy of overthrow of government" in the
Dennis case; and "sensitive area in a school room" in the
Adler case--we still have the question of what is the
present standard to be applied in addition to whether the
Gwinn Amendment measures up to the standard.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has presented a good
statement of the currently applied test:
Congress may impinge upon the freedoms guaranteed
by the First amendment in order to prevent a substan-
tial evil. No absolute test can be laid down in advance as
to when such attempted abridgment by legislation of such
freedoms is constitutional, and when not. This necessi-
tates that whenever courts are called upon to pass upon
the constitutionality of such type of legislation they weigh
the substantiality of the evil sought to be prevented there-
by against the harm that will result from the restriction
imposed by such legislation upon freedom of speech and
assembly. If the evil sought to be prevented is considered
to be of sufficient substantiality to warrant the restric-
tion, the legislation will be upheld as constitutional,
otherwise not. In weighing the substantiality of the evil
sought to be combated, considerable weight is to be ac-
corded to any finding made by congress with respect
thereto.a
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin then continued:
This court deems the possible harm which might result
in suppressing freedoms of the First amendment out-
weigh any threatened evil posed by the occupation by
members of subversive organizations of units in federally
82 Most recently applied in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
8 Lawson v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W2d
605, 614, cert. denied, 76 S. Ct. 135 (1955). For an excellent general discus-
sion see Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned
Public Spending, 41 CoRmNL L.Q. 12 (1955).
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aided housing projects. For this reason we must hold
Resolution 513 [of the Milwaukee Housing Authority] to
the Gwinn Amendment to be unconstitutional and void.8 4
In Peters v. New York City Housing Authority, the
appellants contended that.s'
If the "clear and present danger" test as a permissive
exception to the First Amendment freedoms is to be
abandoned, then these freedoms remain unimpaired and
the tenants of public housing must be free to pursue
their associations and beliefs. If the "clear and present
danger" test is to be applied, what is the danger which
the Congress has the power to control or prevent which
empowers it to compel the housing authority to impose a
political association test on people of low income who
live in federally aided housing? Is it to be presumed
that there is any danger, clear, present, probable or even
uncertain in the political beliefs and associations of the
low-cost housing tenants any more than those of any
other kind of housing in which the poor live their humble,
peaceful lives?
Perhaps the correct approach to applying the require-
ments of the First Amendment freedom is to suggest that
with respect to "loyalty" of tenants in low rent housing
projects "there is neither 'great power over the economy'
as in Douds, nor 'advocacy of overthrow of the govern-
ment' as in Dennis, nor even 'sensitive area in a school
room,' as in Adler."8 6
V
In addition to the very grave doubts as to the con-
stitutionality of the Gwinn Amendment and the regula-
tions thereunder it is appropriate briefly to comment upon
the policy considerations involved. If a policy of deny-
ing some of the benefits provided by our government to
"subversive" minorities is ever justifiable, one is puzzled
84 Lawson v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d
605, 615, cert. denied, 76 S. Ct. 135 (1955).
85 Brief for Appellants, pp. 59, 60, Peters v. New York City Housing Au-
thority, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954).
86 Id. at 60.
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as to the justification for withholding the benefits of only
one of the various programs designed to assist housing.
Assuming that the Gwinn Amendment requirement can
be applied to all tenants in low rent housing projects, one
wonders why in principle a similar requirement should
not be extended to all those who benefit from various
federal housing activities. Indeed, by the same reasoning
one might raise the question of why exclude "subversive"
minorities only from housing. There are of course many
federal activities which are beneficial to the recipients and
on policy considerations the exclusion of a minority from
one benefit would seem to be as justifiable as for another.
Those who assume that the Gwinn Amendment type
of requirement is constitutional perhaps reason in the
following fashion: (1) Government can keep out of
public housing those who are "subversive"; (2) Members
of any one of the some 200 organizations designated by
the Attorney General as "subversive" are "subversive";
ergo, (3) Government can keep out of public housing
members of some 200 named organizations. The ironical
aspects of the Gwinn Amendment type of requirement
is that doubtless many tenants would be ineligible for
membership in many of the organizations on the Attorney
General's list. Certainly it is far from clear why tenants
of low rent housing projects should be singled out for
special tests of their "loyalty."
When one views the Gwinn Amendment type of re-
quirement .on "practical grounds" one must be forceably
struck with the thought that a person who is truly "sub-
versive" would hardly hesitate to sign a certificate to the
effect that 'he was a member of no "subversive" organiza-
tion. Perhaps the net effect of the Gwinn Amendment
wvould be simply to open up the possibility of perjury
convictions for those who may be members of any one of
the 200 organizations designated by the Attorney General
and refused to disclose such membership.
19561
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The fact that only a very, very small proportion of the
tenants in some 282,000 units to which the Gwinn Amend-
ment has been applied' in no way reflects the undesirable
psychological effects which requirements of a "loyalty
oath" has produced.'
Henry N. Williams*
87 A United Press survey in April, 1953 indicated that out of a sampling
of 61,000 tenants in low-rent housing projects only 45 refused to sign the
"loyalty oath." Of those who refused to sign 17 were tenants of housing
projects in Los Angeles where "subversion" is reputed to be acute. N.Y.
Times, April 26, 1953, § 8, p. 1, col. 8. By September, 1955, the New York
Housing Authority had distributed certificate blanks to 30,000 tenants. Ini-
tially all but 21 of the tenants signed the required forms and of these 5
have since given up the fight, with only 16 tenants remaining who refuse
to sign. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1955, p. 33, col. 6.
88 See Jahoda and Cook, Security Measures and Freedom. of Thought.
An Explanatory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs, 61
YALE L. J., 295 (1952).
* Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University.
[Vol xxm
